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EQUIPMENT LEASING BY MOTOR CARRIERS:
RATE REGULATION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Motor common carriers may be divided into two categories: those
whose hauling equipment is owned by the carrier (self-sustaining carriers)
and those whose hauling equipment, or part of it, is leased to the carrier
(leasing carriers). In many cases leased equipment is operated by its
owner (owner-operator), who is compensated by the lessee carrier on a
mileage or revenue percentage basis.
The Interstate Commerce Commission uses various tests : for deter-
mining whether a carrier's proposed rate is just and reasonable according
to the Interstate Commerce Act.' One of these tests is the determination
whether a proposed rate is compensatory, i.e., whether the rate will produce
revenue adequate to meet costs plus a fair return. Since carriers subject
to the act must keep accounts in the manner prescribed by the Commis-
sion, 4 self-sustaining carriers have in their records all the costs of move-
ment; leasing carriers, however, do not have in their records all the costs
of movement 5 since most of the actual costs of movement are incurred by
their owner-operators. Hence, in one rate proceeding in which the Com-
mission's determination was to be made on the basis of the proposed rate's
relationship to the costs of its generation, it became necessary for the
Commission to decide whether the costs to be considered would be solely
those incurred by the carrier-its expenses-or those incurred by the
movement-the carrier's expenses plus the owner-operator's expenses. If
the Commission were to choose the latter alternative, it would have to face
the result that, unless the leasing carriers could produce the actual costs
or offer indirect proof of the costs incurred by their owner-operators,
7
' See, e.g., Aluminum or Aluminum Articles from Newport, Ark., to the East,
306 I.C.C. 607 (1959) ; Aluminum or Aluminum Articles from or to Newport, Ark.,
306 I.C.C. 579 (1959); Wire and Tubes from New Jersey to Memphis, Tenn., 305
I.C.C. 580 (1959) ; Cotton Piece Goods in the South, 304 I.C.C. 667 (1958).
2§216(b), 49 Stat 558 (1935); 49 U.S.C. §316(b) (1964).
3 See, e.g., New Automobiles in Interstate Commerce, 259 I.C.C. 475, 499-530
(1945).
4 Interstate Commerce Act § 204(a) (1), 49 Stat 546 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 304
(a) (1) (1964).
6 Iron or Steel Scrap from Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island to
Pennsylvania, 318 I.C.C. 567, 574 (1962).
6 Motor carrier rate determinations are considered in terms of "operating ratios."
The operating ratio is the ratio of the carrier's expenses of operation to its gross
revenues. In general an operating ratio of .9 is considered adequate. Obviously, since
the motor carrier's investment is small compared to its costs of operation, the "fair
return on full value" principle of rate setting is inapposite.
7 The burden of proof is on the carrier to show that the proposed rate change
is just and reasonable. § 216(g), 49 Stat. 558 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 316(g)
(1964).
(835)
836 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.114:835
they would be foreclosed from the rate flexibility enjoyed by self-sustaining
carriers. If the Commission were to choose the former alternative, it
would have to face the possibility that leasing carriers, under the pressure
of competition, might seek and obtain rates too low to attract the services
of owner-operators, thereby unstabilizing their own operations.
I. THE COMISSION'S DECISION
On the basis of a previous dictum,8 the Commission held in Floor
Coverings or Related Articles from East to South9 that leasing carriers
must, in order to have a rate reduction approved, prove that the proposed
rate would exceed the costs of the movement by producing evidence of
those costs. On appeal in Malone Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States,10
the Commission's position was sustained:
Whether rates are just and reasonable within the nebulous
statutory standard is a question of fact to be resolved by the
Commission after according appropriate weight to the evidence
offered in their support. . . . It seems obvious that rates which
are not compensatory are not just and reasonable. . .. No costs
were presented whereby the Commission could determine whether
the proportion of the gross revenue received by owner-operators
is sufficient to represent a compensatory return, despite a pre-
vious admonition that the Commission was vitally interested in
cost data for representative owner-operator movements.
The Commission found inadequate to support a finding that
the proposed rates would be compensatory evidence relating to
L . . [the carrier's] system average expenses. . . . As we
observed once before, "under the limited review here permitted,
it cannot be held that the Commission erred in finding that the
plaintiff had not met its burden of proof." 11
Eight months after the Malone Freight Lines decision, the Commis-
sion abandoned the Floor Coverings rule in Iron or Steel Scrap from
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island to Pennsylvania.12 The
leasing carrier had had its proposed rate in effect for over seven years;
it compensated the owner-operators by paying them seventy percent of the
gross revenues.13 The Commission's analysis was straightforward: the
production of the actual costs it had hoped to achieve under the rule of
Malone Freight Lines had not materialized. 14 The Commission reasoned
8 Class Rates and Ratings, Malone Freight Lines, Inc., 304 I.C.C. 395, 398 (1958).
9 Class Rates and Ratings, Malone Freight Lines, Inc, 313 I.C.C. 530 (1961).
10 204 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Ala. 1962).
11 Id. at 754-55.
12 318 I.C.C. 567 (1962).
13 Id. at 572, 575.
14 Id. at 574.
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that such production would require that owner-operators keep accounts
in the manner prescribed for carriers, but
owner-operators are not subject to direct regulation by the Com-
mission. They are not required to maintain accounts and records
in any particular form. They are not required to file annual
reports. Even if they were willing to supply cost data to the car-
riers they serve, the Commission would be unable to verify such
information.15
Since
Under the present state of the law and Commission regula-
tions, it is impossible to determine whether the division of the
revenue retained by an owner-operator is sufficient to cover his
costs. 16
Therefore
When . . . a division of the revenue fully compensates the car-
rier for providing the transportation service in question, the rate
which produces that revenue must be regarded as reasonably com-
pensatory. This does not mean, however, that any particular
revenue split will result in automatic approval of the challenged
rate. The Commission must be satisfied that the rate and the
division thereof are sufficient to purchase the transportation serv-
ice in question; that it is sufficient, in other words, to acquire or
to retain the services of the owner-operators in the movement of
traffic to which the rate is applicable.17
The Commission had weighed two considerations in reaching its deci-
sion: the leasing carriers' burden of producing actual costs evidence derived
from the inadequate records of the owner-operators, and the need for rates
which are compensatory not only to the costs of the carriers, but also to
the costs of the movement. Hence an evaluation of the Commission's deci-
sion requires analysis of the weights of these two considerations. Since
each of them is given full exposition in Commissioner Freas' dissent to the
Iron or Steel Scrap decision,' 8 it is to that source we turn for the raw
material of the analysis.
The Freas dissent deals first with the majority's conclusion that the
actual costs incurred by the owner-operators are not and cannot be made
available. It contends:
It is true that . . . an owner-operator . . . may not be di-
rectly subject to our jurisdiction. However, there is no question
'5 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17Id. at 575. (Emphasis added.)
18 Id. at 576-81.
838 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
that we have full power and authority over the regulated carrier
utilizing owner-operators; in fact, their relationship is now regu-
lated in many respects. . . . Owner-operators are merely and
simply the means or an instrumentality through which line-haul
transportation is being performed in the name, under the respon-
sibility, and pursuant to the operating rights of the carrier, and at
its published rates. When acting for and on behalf of the author-
ized carrier the owner-operator has, thus, no independent status,
in law or in fact, insofar as the shipping public is concerned. It
seems obvious that the same should also hold true from a regu-
latory point of view.19
This argument, however, fails to take into account the language of the
statute. The owner-operators are not carriers. 20 The Commission's "full
power" over carriers is no fuller than the statute provides. The section of
the act 2 ' which requires that carriers maintain records in accordance with
Commission standards provides no more than that; the section does not
require that carriers provide records other than their own. Under Freas'
reasoning, it seems that the carrier could be compelled to show the costs
incurred by any of its suppliers of services or materials. The only basis
given for the dissent's assertion of power ' is the affirmation by the Su-
preme Court in American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States 2 of the Com-
mission's earlier promulgation of rules affecting the relationship between
leasing carriers and their owner-operators. But the dissent's dependence
hints of bootstraps, for the Court said:
What we have said above answers appellants' companion conten-
tion that the rules are invalid because they violate the National
Transportation Policy as set out in 49 U.S.C. preceding § 1.
Regulation under the Act is there declared to be in the interests
of the preservation of the inherent advantages of all modes of
transportation, and of an economically sound, safe, and efficient
industry. . . . But no overly-nice distinction between law and
policy is needed to support the view that the question is hardly one
for the courts; it is clear that the rules represent, at best, a com-
promise between stability and flexibility of industry conditions,
each alleged to be in the national interest, and we can only look to
see if the Commission has applied its familiarity with transporta-
tion problems to these conflicting considerations.24
19 Id. at 578.
20See Thomson v. United States, 321 U.S. 19 (1944); United States v. N. E.
Rosenblum Truck Lines, Inc., 315 U.S. 50 (1941).
2 § 204(a) (1), 49 Stat 546 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1) (1964).
2318 I.C.C. at 578.
2344 U.S. 298 (1953).
2 4 Id. at 313-14.
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The rules promulgated by the Commission that received the Court's
blessing did not, as the dissent suggests, extend the Commission's power
to the owner-operators. They merely sought to formalize the relation-
ship between leasing carriers and owner-operators so that the Commis-
sion could more accurately determine which owner-operators were working
for which leasing carriers. No affirmative obligations were placed on
the owner-operators; no affirmative obligations were placed upon the
leasing carriers to require the performance of affirmative obligations of
their owner-operators. 2  The dissent's attempt to characterize the
25 The use of nonowned equipment by authorized carriers is not illegal, either
under the Act or the rules under consideration. But evidence is overwhelming
that a number of satellite practices directly affect the regulatory scheme of the
Act, the public interest in necessary service and the economic stability of the
industry, and it is on these that the rules focus. It appears, for instance, that
while many arrangements are reduced to writing, oral leases are common;
some were concluded after the trips were made and in several cases exempt
operators solicited business themselves with blank authorized carrier forms
or other evidence of agency. It is strongly urged that this very informality
of the contractual relationship between carrier and exempt operator creates
conditions in the industry inconsistent with those which the Act contemplates.
Proof was proffered during the proceedings that the informal and tenuous
relationships in lease and interchange permit evasions of the limitations on
certificated or permitted authority. Since the driver of the exempt equip-
ment is not an employee of the carrier, sanctions for violation of geographical
restrictions are clearly difficult to impose, especially in the case of the single-
trip lessor. Interchange may, as well, become a device to circumvent geo-
graphical restrictions in the certificate. The practice of authorized carriers
conducting operations beyond the territory they are entitled to serve under
cover of a lease from the local carrier was clearly shown in the evidence
before the Commission. It appeared, in fact, that some of these operations
are entirely fictional being created ad hoc after the trip is made-and this at
times in the wake of a specific denial by the Commission of an application to
serve the area.
It was also alleged, and shown by evidence of some incidents, that the
Commission's safety requirements were not observed by exempt lessors. Be-
cause of the fact that the great bulk of the arrangements cover only one trip,
leasing carriers have little opportunity or desire to inspect the equipment
used, especially in cases where the agreement is made without the operator's
appearance at the carrier's terminal. Enforcement sanctions by the carriers
for violations would be clearly as difficult to impose as route standards.
Hence, the carrier may not extend the supervision of rest periods, doctors'
certificates, brakes, lights, tires, steering equipment and loading, normally
accorded his own employees and vehicles, to equipment and drivers secured
through lease. And the owner-operator himself is called upon to push himself
and his truck because of the economic impact of time spent off the road and
investment in repairs on his slim profit margin. (The conclusion that high-
way safety may be impaired rests admittedly on informed speculation rather
than statistical certainty. A road check examination conducted by the Bureau
did not indicate any significant difference in the number of safety violations
between leased and owned vehicles.) [Footnote by the Court.]
The footnote undercuts the dissent's reference to safety. 318 I.C.C. at 579. The
Court continued:
Further, the absence of written agreements has made the fixing of the
lessee's responsibility for accidents highly difficult.
Consequences on the economic stability of the industry were also noted.
The carrier engaged in leasing practice is at the mercy of the cost and supply
of exempt equipment available to him. Hence, he may at times find himself
unable to undertake shipping obligations because no trucks are available willing
to make a relatively unprofitable trip or to assume the burdens of less-than-
carload service.
American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 303-05 (1953). (Emphasis
added.)
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owner-operators as carriers thus must fail; 2 6 they are not reached by
the act.
2 7
The dissent next contends that the majority erected a false barrier
in deciding that since it could not compel the keeping of accounts, it could
not acquire the information. "Insofar as I am able to determine, we have
never rejected as valueless data presented by or for a carrier, a shipper,
or anyone else, solely on the ground that they were not subject to the
reporting or accounting requirements of the act." 2 8 This argument distorts
the majority's position. The cost figures of the owner-operators were not
rejected merely because there were no accounts and records kept by the
owner-operators in the Commission-prescribed form against which they
could be "verified"; they were rejected because without those records and
accounts the costs could not be reliably developed by the Commission or
the owner-operator. In other words, the figures were rejected because
they were inherently unreliable. 9
Hence, since the information cannot be developed without a uniform
system of accounting, and since there is no Commission power to impose
the system on the owner-operators, the Commission must either function
in rate proceedings without the costs information or uniformly reject the
attempts of leasing carriers to have a rate flexibility akin to that of self-
sustaining carriers.
The dissent also contends that the rule proposed by the majority pro-
duces results inequitable to the self-sustaining carriers:
It would be quite inconsistent with the "fair and impartial
regulation" demanded by the national transportation policy to
accord carriers who use owner-operators special privileges or
dispensation not afforded carriers using their own vehicles and
26In United States v. Drum, 368 U.S. 370 (1962), the Court held that owner-
operators carrying the goods of a shipper were contract carriers. The Court affirmed
the Commission's reasoning that since the owner-operators furnished a special service
to the shipper, maintained the equipment and bore the financial risk of the transporta-
tion, they were contract carriers within the statute. § 203(a) (15), 49 Stat. 544
(1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 303(a) (15) (1964). In the case of these owner-
operators who work for carriers, however, there is no section of the statute which
is applicable; furthermore in Drnm the difference between deciding one way or the
other was the difference between bringing the entire operation under regulation or
leaving the whole operation outside regulation, except for matters of safety regulation.
Here calling the owner-operators carriers would require the invention by the Com-
mission of a category in which to put them. It seems obvious that if Congress had
wanted the owner-operators to be carriers it would not have omitted or excluded them
from the class of carriers by its definitions of carriers. In Drum there was a category;
here there is not.27 § 203(a) (14), (15), 49 Stat. 544 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 303(a) (14),
(15) (1964).
28 318 I.C.C. at 578.
29 In Meats and Packinghouse Products from Midwest to Coast, 309 I.C.C. 551,
563 (1960), the Commission accepted, in lieu of actual costs, evidence of the owner-
operators' statistical estimates based on the tax returns of the owner-operators. The
Commission characterized the results as "reasonably reliable" and "rough approxi-
mations." Apparently these approximations were the best evidence the Commission
ever got of owner-operators' costs. The Iron or Steel Scrap majority concluded
that "it is virtually impossible for carriers to collect and submit reliable cost data
for representative owner-operator movements." 318 I.C.C. at 574.
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their own employees for the performance of their duties as public
carriers. While the latter may be required to submit cost evidence
concerning their service as a whole, yet the former would not be
subject to the same but to a much lesser and perfunctory measure
of proof. More importantly, the relaxed requirements for car-
riers using owner-operators would confer upon them an undue
competitive ratemaking advantage30
First, let us consider what the above quotation characterizes as the less
important consideration-that the leasing carrier would have only a perfunc-
tory burden to carry to achieve approval of its rates under the majority's
rule. The leasing carrier would first have to prove that the proposed rate
would produce revenue sufficient to yield a return compensatory to itself; it
seems safe to assume that it could easily do so. Then it would have to prove
that it could attract or retain the services of the owner-operators essential to
its operation. Notwithstanding the dissent's protestations to the contrary,3 1
in practice this burden has not been so easily met.3 2 Furthermore it is a
burden which need not be met by the self-sustaining carrier in the analogous
situation; for example, the self-sustaining carrier is not required to show
that the wages paid to its drivers are sufficient to acquire or retain their
services. Finally, each kind of carrier is really doing the same thing;
it is presenting to the Commission all the costs it has in its books. The
self-sustaining carrier is not required to show to the Commission any
records and accounts other than its own. If a self-sustaining carrier
should purchase its trucks at half price so that its depreciation figures were
halved, would the dissenting Commissioner require that the self-sustaining
carrier produce the accounts of the seller of the trucks to prove their actual
cost? Or would the carrier's cost be satisfactory?
Second, let us consider the competitive ratemaking advantage alluded
to by Commissioner Freas. Obviously a ratemaking advantage is of no
consequence unless it can be implemented; it cannot be implemented unless
the conditions of the majority are met--i.e., that the services of the neces-
sary owner-operators are available. But once the leasing carrier has
achieved the approval and the implementation of the rate, the self-sustaining
carrier is free to use the same rate since it can obtain the Commission's
approval in a proceeding in which the only basis of decision is the rate
comparison. Hence the case that must be considered is the case where
the leasing carrier does implement the rate while the self-sustaining car-
rier cannot because its return on that rate would be less than its cost. Two
obvious factors arise: There was no evidence in Iron or Steel Scrap that
there were any competitors to whom the competition offered by the re-
3o Id. at 578.
31 Id. at 580.
32 See, e.g., Sullivan Lines, General Commodities, East and Midwest, 325 I.C.C.
221 (1965); Tinplate from Fairless, Pa., to Hillside, N.J., 323 I.C.C. 642 (1964).
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spondent carrier would be destructive,3 3 and there was no hint in the
majority opinion that the result would have been the same if there had been
such evidence. Is it to be the task of the Commission to see that there is
no competition in the transportation industry? It seems obvious that one
of the Commission's functions is to balance competition with stability. Yet
the position of the dissent is that the mere specter of competition which
reduced rates to leasing carriers might evoke must be eliminated. We must
suppose, of course, that the return to the owner-operators is less than
compensatory-otherwise the discussion is merely one concerned with
whether leasing carriers can use an inference that their ability to acquire
or retain owner-operators' services implies that the owner-operators are
being compensated. The discussion that this inference requires is of an
entirely different nature since it entails no fundamental difference in the
Commission's approach to ratemaking.3 4 Thus, supposing that there is no
destructive competition and that the owner-operators are working for a
less than compensatory return, we must turn to the implications of these
assumptions.
The dissent suggests two different bases for the owner-operator's
willingness to work for a less than compensatory return. The first draws
a picture of the vagabond, indigent owner-operator stranded away from
home, willing to drive for the leasing carrier for bare expenses.3 5 To
the extent that this owner-operator's situation is worthy of serious con-
cern, it seems obvious that he will be better off under the majority's
rule than under the dissent's since, according to the dissent, the majority's
rule will tend to increase the demand for owner-operators, thereby tending
to eliminate the stranded, destitute owner-operator. It seems inconceivable
that a leasing carrier will be able to convince the Commission under the
second criterion of the Iron or Steel Scrap rule that enough vagabonds
exist to supply the service in question. Furthermore the operation of the
rules 6 requiring a written contract and a period of exclusive carrier use
of the vehicle for not less than thirty days, approved in American Trucking
Ass'ns v. United States,3 7 appears designed to eliminate this kind of rela-
tionship.
The other suggestion of the dissent is that owner-operators will
be willing to work for less than compensatory returns because they have
favorable hauls in the other direction so that as far as they are concerned,
an all expenses paid return trip is satisfactory 38 It is difficult to see why
33 The rate had been in effect for seven years, during which no competitors came
forth to protest their being destroyed by it. 318 I.C.C. at 575. Perhaps the dissent
assumes that the competitors were destroyed before they could protest.
34 See text accompanying notes 54-62 infra.
35 318 I.C.C. at 579.
8649 C.F.R. §207.4(a) (1)-(4) (1964).
37 344 U.S. 298 (1953).
38 318 I.C.C. at 580. It is also conceivable that a shipper may wish to ameliorate
some of the expenses of its otherwise empty back hauls by leasing its trucks for the
back hauls. The reasoning in Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. Shannon, 377 U.S. 311
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the leasing carrier who is fortunate enough to encounter this situation
should not be permitted to take advantage of it. The stability of this
carrier is not in question since, in order to obtain approval of the rate,
it has had to show that it can continue to obtain the necessary services
under the second criterion of the rule. Hence nothing is in question except
whether the carrier can take advantage of a bargain. If it could make an
advantageous contract with its drivers and if it could make an advantageous
purchase of its gasoline, there would be no objection. Why then can it not
make an advantageous purchase of its raw transportation? Even if the
same carrier were responsible for the movements in both directions, hav-
ing made separate contracts for the front haul and the back haul with
the same owner-operators, one of which was more lucrative than the other,
so that it could allocate its costs in order to produce a "bargain" haul in'one
direction, it is not altogether clear that these arrangements ought to be
impermissible. A self-sustaining carrier could do the same thing by al-
locating its lowest cost trucks to one movement in order to seek a reduced
rate, for purposes of more effective competition on that movement. In the
case where the carriers in the two directions are different carriers, it seems
clear that the leasing carrier who has gotten the owner-operators for a less
than compensatory return has managed to gain its advantage largely at
the expense of the front haul carrier who is paying enough for the move-
ment in the opposite direction to extinguish the owner-operators' interest
in further profits.39 The operation of the market place, a factor considered
by the dissent in only a single dimension-that of the increased demand for
a service that has advantages-tempers the entire thrust of the argument.
In the event that the proliferation of leasing arrangements forecast by the
dissent actually comes about, it seems obvious that considerations of the
owner-operators working for less than compensatory returns will become
completely academic since it will become more and more difficult to engage
them for less than compensatory returns. Indeed, the explanations offered
now seem wholly inadequate. What we might expect to witness as their
number increases is a reduction in the number of trucks owned by the
formerly self-sustaining carriers to the minimum required by them for
(1964), militates against this possibility, since the Supreme Court there held that a
shipper using its back haul capacity for transportation not related to its business
must become a licensed carrier. An arrangement by the shipper to circumvent the
holding in Red Ball by leasing its trucks would seem to be ill-destined. See Agri-
cultural Transp. Ass'n v. United States, 349 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1965).
39 The front haul carrier's generosity itself suggests that its rate may be the one
which is not just and reasonable. It is too high. Adopting the dissent's reasoning,
it follows that the generous carrier has acted to the benefit of the leasing carrier and
to the detriment of the competing self-sustaining carrier. Perhaps the self-sustaining
carrier's energy should be directed to the generous carrier, instead of the leasing
carrier. The energy would then be expended to reduce an overly-excessive rate rather
than to increase a low, but viable, rate.
In the case of a shipper which is attempting to avoid the losses of empty back
hauls, it seems questionable that it will continue to operate in an expanding market
for an extended time for just expenses. Even if it does, the shipper's contribution
to increased efficiency is neither different from nor less valuable than the owner-
operator's.
844 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.114:835
full-time service and the hiring by them of owner-operators to meet re-
quirements during periods of high activity. Since the demand for the
owner-operators will have increased, we might expect that the current
leasing carriers will begin to depend more and more on trucks owned by
themselves up to that same minimum (here, a maximum). Hence we
might look forward to a different kind of stability, one where each carrier
owns the equipment that it requires on a full-time basis and leases what
it needs in excess-the owner-operator simply forming a pool of transporta-
tion which appears where needed. Obviously, to the extent that such a
final arrangement might come to exist, the policies of economy and efficiency
would have been optimally served.
It is clear that the real advantage that the leasing carrier has is not that
it can find owner-operators ready to be exploited, but that it need assume
only the expenses that its service requires; it does not have to be burdened
with trucks that are stationary; when trucks are not in use, they are in
someone else's service so that the leasing carrier can escape the expense of
inefficient ownership. It is the avoidance of unrequited depreciation that
gives the leasing carrier its advantage over the self-sustaining carrier. It
seems at least arguable that allowing the leasing carrier to take advantage
of the increased efficency that comes with the use of owner-operators is
worth the burdens of competition. The alternative seems to be to protect
the carriers-both railroads and self-sustaining carriers-that have heavy
investment at the expense of the leasing carriers and their owner-operators.
Obviously if the result were to destroy the railroads as a system, or the
self-sustaining carriers as an entity, the value of the position taken by the
majority would pale. But the collapse of the railroads is not so imminent
and the entry of these carriers into leasing so desirable that we need cower
before them, especially since a desirable and possible result of the major-
ity's position can be foreseen-that is, maximum utilization of trucking
capacity. No one can question that in the long run the shipping public and
the consuming public will be better served by an efficient transportation
industry. A reserve supply of trucks, appearing only as the demand for
them increases and in quantities sufficient to meet the demand, seems
desirable. The Commission's position in Iron or Steel Scrap seemed cor-
rectly contoured to allow the development of that possibility while simul-
taneously protecting the carrier from excessive zeal and instability.
II. THE CommissioN's RECANTATION
In Drugs and Related Articles, New Jersey to Chicago,40 the Com-
mission approved a rate reduction pursuant to the rule of Iron or Steel
Scrap. Eastern Central Motor Carriers Association, a protestant in Drugs
and Related Articles, appealed the Commission's decision, attacking not
the manner of the Commission's application of the rule in Drugs and
Related Articles, but rather the promulgation of it in Iron or Steel Scrap.
40 322 I.C.C. 734 (1963).
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The district court reversed and remanded to the Commission for recon-
sideration.41 The Commission reconsidered and modified its rule, recanting
its position that only the carrier must receive a compensatory return and
returning to the position that the carrier must prove that the rate is com-
pensatory to the costs of the movement, but allowing as part of this proof
the inference that the compensation received by the owner-operators is
compensatory if it is sufficient to acquire or retain their services. Once
again the Commission allowed the rate reduction to the carrier. The
reversing court then granted Eastern Central's motion to declare the
Commission's reconsideration decision a nullity because it was inconsistent
with the court's remand.43
In order to decide whether the court correctly granted the motion of
Eastern Central, it is necessary to consider the differences between the
two decisions by the Commission in Drugs and Related Articles (in effect,
the difference between the Iron or Steel Scrap decision and the second
Drugs and Related Articles decison) and to understand what the court's
first opinion meant.
In Eastern Central Motor Carriers Ass'n v. United States,4 the
court's first conclusion after its consideration of the Iron or Steel Scrap
case was that "no rational basis is here disclosed that makes the collection
or submission of costs for owner-operator movements an impossibility." 45
The Commission had attributed that impossibility to "the present state of
the law and Commission regulations." 4 6  The court did not deal with
the Commission's interpretation of the "present state of the law and
Commission regulations"; it simply rejected the Commission's conclusion
that obtaining the cost information would result in requiring the owner-
operators, like carriers, to keep records and accounts for the Commission.
47
Hence the court was able to assume, notwithstanding that it had found
no basis for the Commission's position that the information was impossible
of collection, that the information was difficult of collection:
41 Eastern Cent. Motor Carriers Ass'n v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 591
(D.D.C. 1965).
42Drugs and Related Articles, N.J. to Chicago, 326 I.C.C. 6, 11 (1965).
43 Eastern Cent. Motor Carrier Ass'n v. United States, Civil No. 1234-64, D.D.C.,
Jan. 11, 1966.
44239 F. Supp. 591 (D.D.C. 1965).
45 Id. at 599.
46 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
47 If the court had meant to put its rejection of the Commission's position on the
ground that the Commission had misinterpreted the state of the law or its regulations,
one might expect that the court would have alluded to the Commission's error.
Further, the court would then have been able to inform the Commission of the proper
manner in which to apply the law or regulation. The court's decision, instead, that
the Commission had shown no rational basis for needing more power than it has to
compel the production of the evidence, implies that the evidence is available under
the Commission's view of its power. Hence the court must have been saying that
the Commission could achieve the production of the evidence with some degree of
difficulty. It is that notion of a continuum of difficulty, culminating in a degree called
impossibility, which predicates the court's opinion.
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Assuming that the acquisition of owner-operator costs, while
not impossible, is nevertheless difficult, the question then becomes
whether the need for production of the evidence out-weighs the
burden placed on the carrier and owner-operator. In our opinion,
in order to meet the standards of the National Transportation
Policy and the requirements of the applicable statutes, the need
does out-weigh the burden ...
The second requirement [that the amount paid to the owner-
operators is sufficient to retain the services of owner-operators]
is based on the assumption that an owner-operator will hire him-
self out to the carrier only if his earnings from his operations
exceed his costs or expenses. This is patently questionable ...
Thus a carrier can attract as owner-operator willing to be em-
ployed when the owner-operator's income will not defray his
expenses. Obviously, this makes the rate non-compensatory and,
therefore, unjust and unreasonable-contrary to Sections 216(b)
and 216(d) of the Interstate Commerce Act.
4 8
What were the implications of these statements with respect to the
court's mandate to the Commission on remand? First it must be observed
that the line of analysis quoted was predicated on the assumption that the
evidence could, albeit with difficulty, be collected. Since the analysis was
so predicated, it follows that the court must not have meant it to apply if
the evidence was impossible of collection; otherwise, of course, the predica-
tion would have been unnecessary-the court would have said: "Notwith-
standing that the evidence is impossible of collection, the need for its
production outweighs the misfortune that must befall the carrier and owner-
operators who fail to produce it. . . ." Hence, it seems, the court's
assumption left open to the Commission on remand the option to supply
a rational basis for its position that the evidence was impossible of col-
lection. But the assumption left open more than that to the Commission:
since there is not a distinct boundary between impossibility and difficulty,
there must be some degrees of difficulty of collection that would carry the
balance the other way. So, then, the Commission on remand would be
free to build a rational basis for its finding of impossibility of collection or
for a finding of a degree of difficulty higher than that the court had
balanced 49
48239 F. Supp. at 599-600 (emphasis in original).
49 One may envision a result of this distribution of responsibilities seemingly
created by the court whereby the Commission develops a record finding a certain
degree of difficulty, decides on the basis of that finding to promulgate a rule, and so
promulgates. The court then finds that the Commission's record does not sustain
that degree of difficulty but only a lesser degree inadequate to sustain its rule. On
remand the Commission builds a record which does sustain a finding of a greater
degree of difficulty than it had previously. The court balances anew. The question
then arises: who is doing the balancing? See text accompanying note 64 infra for
the court's answer.
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The dispositive element of the court's reasoning, however, militates
against this reading of the mandate. The court concluded that the Com-
mission's rule in Iron or Steel Scrap was inconsistent with Sections 216(b)
and 216(d). This conclusion was grounded on the following syllogism:
(1) the Iron or Steel Scrap rule does not necessarily imply that a rate is
compensatory (with respect to the costs of the movement) ; (2) rates which
are not compensatory (with respect to the costs of the movement) are not
just and reasonable; (3) therefore rates approved under the Iron or Steel
Scrap rule are unjust and unreasonable. Since the syllogism's validity
does not depend on whether the information is possible of collection, it
follows that the rule of Iron or Steel Scrap would be illegal whether or not
the information was possible of collection. Hence there would be no need
for the predication used by the court. Yet operate on that predication
it did.
Having concluded that the Iron or Steel Scrap rule was illegal, the
court continued:
Carriers with self-sustaining operations are vying with carriers
employing owner-operators. . . . Under the criterion of the
Iron or Steel Scrap case, applicable here, the same standard is
not applied to carriers using owner-operators. They have only
to prove that part of the revenue, the part they retain, exceeds
their costs. . . . Unequal treatment is accorded . . . . This,
in our opinion, is unjust discrimination against the self-sustaining
carrier, as prohibited by the National Transportation Policy.50
The value of this addendum to the opinion is uncertain; since the Iron or
Steel Scrap rule is illegal according to the court's analysis, what is the
contribution of the continuation of the argument to the effect that that
illegality is an "unjust discrimination" when its effects are applied to only
one kind of carrier?
The opinion concludes:
All that this court holds is that, in absence of sufficient reasons,
when the costs method is used to prove the compensativeness of
reduced motor carrier rates, that full production of evidence is
required for both the self-sustaining carrier and the carrier using
owner-operators, in order to meet the requirements of the National
Transportation Policy and Sections 216(b), (d) and (g).51
The italicized portion suggests again that the Commission was free on
remand to offer sufficient reasons for its decision to adopt the rule of Iron
or Steel Scrap; these reasons could only be that the information was im-
possible of collection or more difficult of collection than the court had
60 239 F. Supp. at 600-01.
51 Id. at 601.
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assumed. The alternative to supplying these reasons would be that the
Commission must modify or abandon the rule of Iron or Steel Scrap.
The Commission on reconsideration, perhaps motivated by the elusive-
ness of the court's mandate, attempted to amplify its previous conclusion
that the evidence was impossible of collection and adopted a standard
different from the Iron or Steel Scrap rule.
In Iron or Steel Scrap, the Comnission had said almost nothing in
support of its conclusion that the owner-operator cost information was
impossible of collection. 52  On reconsideration it extensively discussed the
difficulty (impossibility) of collection:
Cost evidence which is presented by a carrier to show com-
pensativeness will actually support such a finding only if the evi-
dence can be substantiated and is reliable. Regulated carriers
must maintain records in a prescribed manner and submit annual
reports containing specified data to the Commission. Thus when
such carriers present cost evidence, its validity is easily ascer-
tained. The same is not true of any data concerning owner-
operators. Furthermore, we have no authority to require them
to maintain records in any particular manner and submit reports
to the Commission. Thus, many owner-operators keep few if any
records at all because their methods of operation do not necessitate
it. This is largely attributable to the fact that it is often a one-
man operation, which in practice extends beyond the transporta-
tion of the goods for the carrier. True, the owner-operator drives
the truck, but he is also concerned with protecting the investment
he has made in his equipment; he maintains the vehicle in good
repair and is likely to do much of the work related thereto except
major overhauls; he purchases the gas, oil, tires, and anything else
pertaining to his truck; he decides for whom he shall haul and
negotiates the appropriate contract perhaps, as here, guided by
union standards; and finally he keeps his own "books," usually
amounting to little more than accumulated sales slips and his
checkbook. To assume that the owner-operator could or would
prepare a statement of income and expense in the detailed and
classified manner needed for costing purposes is totally unrealistic.
Furthermore, what expenses to report for services other than
driving the vehicle, such as repairing the vehicle, that many
owner-operators perform for themselves is difficult to ascertain.
Yet meaningful cost data is not possible without complete informa-
tion. An item of major importance to any owner-operator is
depreciation of the vehicle. Some owner-operators . . . are
able to extend its service life . . . minimizing this expense item.
This is without consideration of another type owner-operator
who owns more than one vehicle . . . . [whose] expenses
52 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
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. . . would more nearly typify those of a carrier operating its
own equipment . . . . A carrier . . . may use one or both of
the above extremes in purchased transportation . . . [mak-
ing] extremely complicated the use of any cost data that might
be collected for arriving at any average cost of purchased trans-
portation. . . . Our conclusion that there is no validly deter-
minable average cost is based on experience. With no average
cost data, no comparison is possible with the specific data that
might be collected, which is itself not subject to any verification
by the Commission as previously mentioned. . .. Even if the
carrier or the Commission did question the costs, there would be
no possible way to verify them. Thus, the collection and publica-
tion of the owner-operator data would serve no useful purpose.p
The Commission's position comes essentially to the information's impos-
sibility of collection because what cost information would be obtained would
be inherently unreliable. Thus the Commission seems to reject the
continuum of difficulty implicit in the court's opinion and to argue simply
that no reliable information exists.
But the Commission also modified its rule.- In Iron or Steel Scrap,
the Commission had said:
It is possible to determine, in accordance with accepted cost-
finding principles, whether the division of revenue retained by the
carrier covers all of its costs. When such a disision of revenue
fully compensates the carrier for providing the transportation
service in question, the rate which produces that revenue must
be regarded as reasonably compensatory.55
The Eastern Central court rejected that statement without pause; it con-
ceded that the rate would be compensatory to the carrier but, because the
rate might not produce revenue sufficient to cover the total costs of the
movement, the court found that the rate would not be compensatory.5 6 On
reconsideration, the Commission adopted the court's definition:
We believe that such data is unnecessary in view of the show-
ing that must be made to meet the second criterion; namely, that
the payment to owner-operators is sufficient to acquire or retain
their service. This criterion demands positive evidence that
owner-operators are willing to perform the movement under con-
sideration at the specified payment and thereby either continue or
establish a long-term relationship with the carrier. The carrier
53 326 I.C.C. at 9, 10.
5 There is no express indication by the Commission in its reconsideration decision
that the different approach to the second criterion of the Iron or Steel Scrap rule was
a conscious departure from the earlier approach. See Bicarbonate of Soda and
Sal-Soda, Syracuse to Chicago, 321 I.C.C. 150 (1963), which seems to apply the Iron
or Steel Scrap rule as if it were the later modification.
65 318 I.C.C. at 574-75. (Emphasis added.)
5 239 F. Supp. at 600.
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must present a meaningful record of employment relating to the
proposed transportation. . . . Thus, on the basis of evidence
which meets the second criterion of the Iron or Steel Scrap case,
we can infer that the payment to the owner-operators does, in
fact, exceed their costs of operation.
57
Hence the Commission reevaluated the use it would make of the second
criterion of the Iron or Steel Scrap rule. It retreated from a form which
focuses attention only on the carrier's well being and stability under its
proposed rate to one which only requires circumstantial evidence of the
compensatory character of a rate with respect to the costs of the move-
ment. Thus the Commission returned to the costs of the movement basis
of determining compensativeness of rates. The Commission had previ-
ously conceded that the owner-operators might be working at a loss. Thus
under the Iron or Steel Scrap rule the Commission could approve a rate
which produced revenue adequate to compensate the carrier and acquire or
retain the services of owner-operators, notwithstanding compelling evidence
that their services were acquired or retained by some advantage to them
other than the share of the revenue received in compensation for their
services.5 Under the modified rule of the reconsideration, such compelling
evidence would defeat the inference. Both the Iron or Steel Scrap dissent 59
and the Eastern Central court 60 dwelled on this "defect" in the original
rule; on reconsideration the Commission seemed to have cured it.
The most extreme reading of the reviewing court's opinion in Eastern
Central is that: (1) the Commission failed to supply a rational basis for its
position that the costs evidence was impossible of collection, and (2) the
rule of Iron or Steel Scrap which the Commission had applied in its first
Drugs and Related Articles decision was illegal because it permitted rates
which were non-compensatory with respect to the costs of the movement.
Even under this reading, the Commission complied with the remand. It
first attempted to supply the rational basis the court bad found wanting for
the conclusion that the evidence was impossible of collection and, second,
modified the application of the rule of Iron or Steel Scrap to obviate the
possibility that it would approve rates even though it was aware that the
showing under the second criterion did not imply that the owner-operators
were being duly compensated.
The court had provided that the rule of Iron or Steel Scrap could not
stand "in the absence of sufficient reasons." The sufficient reasons must
have included impossibility or an inordinately high degree of difficulty of
collection if the form of the court's analysis is to be credited since the
court must have realized that the Commission would so view the remand.
It is possible, of course, that the court misunderstood the import of the
Commission's decision in Iron or Steel Scrap so that, on review of Drugs
67 326 I.C.C. at 11. (Emphasis added.)
58 See text accompanying note 35 supra.
59 318 I.C.C. at 578-80.
60 239 F. Supp. at 600.
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and Related Articles, it conceived the Commission's position to be not
what it was then, but what it was to be after the reconsideration. If the
court did so misconceive the Commission's position, the court's response
to the motion to enforce the judgment brought to declare the reconsidera-
tion decision a nullity is easily understood. Yet the court ought to have
been able to comprehend that the reconsideration decision had eliminated
the record's terseness on the question of the impossibility of collecting the
evidence--surely the reconsideration record was sufficient in that regard
to force the court to reconsider the question of what the Commission must
do if the evidence was impossible of collection. The court's appeal decision
was silent in that regard. The granting of the motion to enforce the judg-
ment was equally silent. It seems clear that the Commission was entitled
to have the motion denied, so that Eastern Central would have to appeal
the Commission's reconsideration decision to reach a decision on the merits,
which merits were not the same as those dealt with in the review of Drugs
and Related Articles because the crucial issue on the reconsideration's
review would necessarily have been the reliability of the inference of the
second criterion of the Iron or Steel Scrap rule. In the review of Drugs
and Related Articles, the reliability of the inference was not in issue be-
cause the Commission's formulation did not put it in issue; the second
criterion served merely to assure the Commission of the carrier's stability.
On the reconsideration of Drugs and Related Articles, the reliability of the
inference was the key issue because, to the extent that it was reliable, there
could be no objection to it. The court's characterization of the Com-
mission's reconsideration decision as a mere reiteration totally falls to take
into account that the Commission had, in that reconsideration, withdrawn
its attempt to abandon the cost of movement basis in rate determinations.
The court's statement in its opinion on the motion that the Commission
"has overlooked the full purport of its Opinion"' 6 seems to suggest that in
its first opinion the court decided a case that was not before it. The motion
to enforce the judgment should have been denied.60
III. THE REVERSAL OF DRUGS AND RELATED ARTICLES
Having explored the judgment of the Commission in Iron or Steel
Scrap and the fate of the Commission's withdrawal from its Iron or Steel
Scrap position in the reconsideration of Drugs and Related Articles, it
61 Drugs and Related Articles, Civil No. 1234-64, D.D.C., Jan. 11, 1966, at 2.
62 Whether the Commission will appeal the decision on the motion is at this time
unclear. If it does appeal, the issue on the appeal will be whether the two Commission
decisions, Irom or Steel Scrap and the reconsideration of Drugs and Related Articles,
are different formulations. If the Commission loses this appeal, it would be foreclosed
from applying either rule to the Drugs and Related Articles litigation, because the
Commission's defeat would imply that the later formulation was the same as the
earlier one, on which time to appeal had run out. It seems safe to predict that the
Commission, committed to the principle of Iron or Steel Scrap as reformulated, would
apply it in another litigation, thereby obliging the protestants to enter that litigation
for a decision on the merits. If, in the other hand, the Commission won the appeal,
the protestants would be able to engage the Commission in that battle on the merits
in an appeal from the reconsideration decision.
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remains only to consider the court's reasoning in deciding that the Commis-
sion's judgment was wrong as a matter of law.
The court first rejected the Commission's conclusion that the costs
evidence of the owner-operators was impossible of collection. Since the
court said nothing about what led it to reject the Commission finding ex-
cept that there was no rational basis for it, one must conclude that the court
meant merely that the record compiled by the Commission was insufficient
to explain the conclusion. In any case, immediately after having rejected
the Commission's operative determination, the court entered upon a dis-
cussion of the balance between the need for the costs evidence and the
"burden" of its production.63 Having decided to balance, logic would
require that the court have some notion of what it was balancing. Since
the record was insufficient to support a finding that the evidence could not
be produced, the court's assumption of the "burden" of its production would
have been dispositive of the result no matter what kind of analysis followed.
Obviously the answer to the question depends specifically on the assumed
degree of burden. Hence one is compelled to wonder whether anything
that follows that assumption is worthy of comment.
What does follow that assumption is a still more curious display of
circumlocution. Having involved the result of the balancing with the as-
sumption so intimately that the result was inherent in the assumption, the
court proceeded to develop an argument that was logically independent
of the assumption so that the significance of the first defect in the court's
reasoning pales before that of the second. The court decided that the Iron
or Steel Scrap rule was illegal in an analysis unrelated to the possibility of
difficulty of collecting the costs evidence.64 The court's finding was that
the need for the production of the costs evidence was required by sections
216(b),65 (d) 66 and (g) 7 of the act and the National Transportation
Policy. 3s We will examine that finding more closely: "Thus a carrier can
63239 F. Supp. at 599.
64The court puts its thumb on one side of the scale and an infinite weight on
the other.
6549 Stat. 558 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 316(b) (1964). This section provides that
all motor carriers shall "establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable rates
• . . and just and reasonable practices relating thereto . . . and all other matters
relating to or connected with the transportation of property in interstate or foreign
commerce."
6649 Stat. 558 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §316(d) (1964). This section
requires all charges to be "just and reasonable" and prohibits "unjust and unreasonable"
charges. This section also carries a provisio: "Provided, however, That this subsection
shall not be construed to apply to discriminations, prejudice, or disadvantage to the
traffic of any other carrier of whatever description." The proviso clarifies what
would otherwise be clear: that the thrust of this section is to unreasonable charges
made to shippers through discrimination, prejudice, or whatever. Its inapplicability
to questions concerning rates of competing carriers seems obvious. The court seems
to have been unaware of the proviso.
6749 Stat. 558 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §316(g) (1964). This section
provides that the burden of proving that a proposed rate change is just and reasonable
is on the carrier which proposes it.68 lnterstate Commerce Act preceding §201, 54 Stat. 899 (1940), 49 U.S.C.
preceding § 301 (1964).
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attract an owner-operator willing to be employed when the owner-opera-
tor's income will not defray his expenses. Obviously, this makes a rate
non-compensatory . . . . " It is obvious that an owner-operator who
works for less than compensatory returns may make a rate non-compensa-
tory with respect to the costs of the movement; it is neither obvious nor
true that his so doing makes the rate non-compensatory with respect to the
expenses of the carrier. The Commission had adopted the latter meaning
in Iron or Steel Scrap.70 The court merely ignored the crucial issue in the
case. Having reached the conclusion that the rate would be non-compen-
satory by assuming that the rate must be compensatory with respect to the
costs of the movement, the court's first step was complete. "Obviously,
this makes a rate non-compensatory and, therefore, unjust and unreason-
able-contrary to Sections 216(b) and 216(d) of the Interstate Commerce
Act." 71 Nothing in either section cited by the court compels the result.
Malone Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States,72 cited by the court for its
affirmance of the Commission's pre-Iron or Steel Scrap position requiring
production of the owner-operator's costs, similarly made the deduction that
rates must be compensatory to be just and reasonable:
Whether rates are just and reasonable within the nebulous statu-
tory standard is a question of fact to be resolved by the Commis-
sion after according appropriate weight to evidence offered in
their support. . . . It seems obvious that rates which are not
compensatory are not just and reasonable. Chicago & E. Ill. R.R.
v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 118 (S.D. Ind. 1952), aff'd nem.,
344 U.S. 917 (1953).
7 3
The case relied on by this court, in turn, for the implication was one in
which the rate was not shown to be compensatory to the carrier. It there-
fore emerges that, in the two cases which raised the issue whether the
rate must be compensatory to the costs of the movement or compensatory
only to the expenses of the carrier, the issue has not been faced. Clearly,
unless the issue is faced, the reliance on sections 216(b) and (d) is uncer-
tain at best.74
Notwithstanding its conclusion that the standard of Iron or Steel Scrap
was illegal, the court proceeded to an argument that the requirement of
total costs evidence from self-sustaining carriers and only partial evidence
from leasing carriers was an "unjust discrimination" within the meaning
09 239 F. Supp. at 600 (emphasis in original).
70 See text accompanying note 17 supra.
71239 F. Supp. at 600.
72204 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Ala. 1962).
73Id. at 754-55.
74 The holding in Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United States, 345 U.S. 146 (1953),
makes the result even more uncertain. The Supreme Court there held that a railroad
carrier must suffer a non-compensatory rate if its overall operation was compensated
under comprehensive schedules. Hence judicial approval of non-compensatory rates
is not entirely unknown.
196
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of the National Transportation Policy. At the outset of its opinion, the
court quoted the National Transportation Policy in full:
It is hereby declared to be the national transportation policy of
the Congress to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all
modes of transportation subject to the provisions of this Act, so
administered as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages
of each; to promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient
service and foster sound economic conditions in transportation
and among the several carriers; to encourage the establishment
and maintenance of reasonable charges for transportation services,
without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages,
or unfair or destructive competitive practices; to cooperate with
the several States . . . to encourage fair wages .... 75
The italicized portion of the above modifies "charges" which are to be
established by the carriers. The court's patently erroneous reading treats
that portion as if it modified "to encourage." The reading requires that
there be meaning in the notion of the Commission's encouraging without
unfair or destructive competitive practices. That the court meant to read
the statement in this manner is demonstrable:
Unequal treatment is accorded on the one hand to the carriers
who own and operate the equipment and who are required to
submit refined and detailed costs data to assure compensativeness
and, on the other hand, to the carriers who lease the equipment
and crew and who submit a lump sum covering the cost of rental
equipment and crew and add to that only administrative and over-
head costs and profit. This, in our opinion, is unjust discrimina-
tion against the self-sustaining carrier, as prohibited by the Na-
tional Transportation Policy.
70
The issue before the court was whether the circumstances surrounding
the collection of owner-operator cost data justified the Commission in
defining the costs to which rates must be compensatory as those of the
carrier, with the proviso that the carrier must show that it could acquire
or retain owner-operators to perform its service. The court did not analyze
the circumstances; it did not deal with the dispositive issue of whether
the Commission was free to define compensatory with respect to the costs
of the carrier. Instead, the court invented two statutory issues 77 to give
75 239 F. Supp. at 595 (emphasis in original).
76 Id. at 601. (Emphasis added.) Apparently, it did not occur to the Commission
to read the National Transportation Policy. On remand the Commission acquiesced
in the court's reading. The Commission decided merely that its discrimination was
reasonable-not "unjust." 326 I.C.C. at 11-12.
77A statutory issue that might have appropriately been raised was not raised.
Section 208(a) of the act provides that the carrier shall not be limited in its right
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substance to its position since that position was no more than an agreement
with the result reached by one group of Commissioners as opposed to the
result reached by another group about the more politic solution to the
problem presented and the need to find a solution.
Conceivably the Commission had failed to fulfill its obligation to ex-
plain to the court why the costs of the owner-operators were impossible of
meaningful assemblage; for that reason the court might have remanded.78
The court's handling of the motion to enforce the judgment, however,
suggests that this failure was not even a reason for the remand.
It is possible, of course, to speculate about the court's motives in
rejecting the Commission's adoption of the Iron or Steel Scrap rule; its
application would involve the Commission in a judgment more subtle than
arithmetical costs judgments, a judgment devoid of the clean edges of
numerical reality. But mathematical precision does not create truth;
it can only preserve it.
CONCLUSION
The discussion began with the Commission's attempt in Iron or Steel
Scrap to free the leasing carriers from a restriction it had placed upon them.
The attempt to collect owner-operator costs, the Commission decided, was
fruitless. Hence the Commission decided that, so long as the carrier was
c6mpensated and stabilized, the proposed rate would be approved. On
appeal the court ignored the substance of what the Commission had at-
tempted to do and concentrated on the possibility that the competitive
position of some self-sustaining carrier might be prejudiced or at least
injured. The court did not consider that its decision might well deprive
the leasing carrier of any effective rate flexibility. Since it is clear that
in only some cases would the Iron or Steel Scrap rule produce rates
incapable of producing returns compensatory to the cost of movement and
thereby work against the interests of the self-sustaining carriers, and
equally clear that the opposite rule would work against the interests of the
leasing carriers in all cases, it seems that the court ought to have balanced
these interests. On the other hand, to the extent that efficiency is an
to augment its equipment § 208(a), 49 Stat. 552 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 308(a) (1964).
Since the effect of requiring a carrier to do the impossible or the very difficult in
order to lease from owner-operators is essentially to stop it from using their services
if it wants rate flexibility (or, if it depends on them entirely, to destroy it), the
question arises whether the carrier's being forced to discontinue its relationship
with its owner-operators is an interference with its right to augment its equipment.
This consideration was not mentioned in this litigation. Mr. Justice Black, however,
raised it in his dissent in American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298,
327 (1953). This case was the culmination of a series of Commission investigations,
reported as the Lease and Interchange of Vehicles by Motor Carriers, 51 M.C.C.
461 (1950), 52 M.C.C. 675 (1951), which produced two more cases, 64 M.C.C. 361
(1955), 68 M.C.C. 553 (1956). These reports should be consulted for an agonizing
excursion through the formulation of the rules finally approved by the Court, but
not finally promulgated entirely by the Commission. See Agricultural Transp. Ass'n
v. United States, 349 F.2d 873, 881-83 (5th Cir. 1965).
78 Cf. ICC v. J-T Transport Co., 368 U.S. 81, 126-30 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
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important element in the long range outlook of the Commission, the court
should have made some attempt to analyze the long range results of the
Iron or Steel Scrap rule. At the very least the Commission's attempt
to ameliorate the problem should have been studied by the court sufficiently
to enable it to tell the difference between the Commission's decision in
Iron or Steel Scrap and the Commission's decision on reconsideration of
Drugs and Related Articles. Under the reformulation in which the Com-
mission returned to the costs of the movement basis, the leasing carrier's
difficulties would be largely resolved, since only in those few cases where
the rate was not justified by the inference would the leasing carrier fail
to gain approval of its proposed rate. Ultimately the question which must
be resolved is whether the protection of the large self-sustaining carriers
is worth the price in efficiency that must be paid. One of the manners in
which insight into this question can be gained is to allow the Commission
sufficient freedom to experiment. The proliferation of owner-operators
and increased dependence on their services may conceivably unstabilize the
industry. But it will not unstabilize the industry so quickly that the Com-
mission cannot prevent serious disruption. Hence, in that area where
there is room for experiment, it seems that the courts should tread carefully
before interfering with the Commission's attempt to solve the problems it
senses in transportation. In this litigation, no single direct competitor
ever came forward to claim injury; the railroads joined the rate bureaus
in a cry of fear for the future. Surely it should be obvious that the concern
for the future health of the industry has not been entrusted to the courts,
but to the Interstate Commerce Commission.79
The Commission has twice in this litigation plunged into the murky
waters of judicial review and twice sunk. Before sinking for the third
time the Commission should have the opportunity to determine the validity
of the propositions that a leasing carrier should be able to purchase its raw
materials at the best price it can without incurring a penalty, and that a
man in general works for profit.
The public and the Commission are entitled to more than unreasoned
syllogisms and meaningless classifications. During a period in which the
results of the release of owner-operators into the market are uncertain, the
public is entitled to the benefit of the doubt in the form of lower cost trans-
portation. The Commission's forced retreat before the specter of future
chaos is unacceptable.
79 "If . . . the court meant to substitute its judgment for the Commission's on
the question . . . we think . . . it indulged in an unwarranted incursion into the
administrative domain. Reversed." United States v. Drum, 368 U.S. 370, 386 (1962).
